Book Review
"Moments are the Elements of Profit": Overtime and the Deregulationof
Working Hours Under the FairLabor StandardsAct, Linder, Marc
(Fanpihua Press, 2000, pp. 524, $15.00)

reviewed by Stephen Fogdallt
Marc Linder has produced an impressively detailed study of the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 1 Indeed,
the book has many virtues. Clearly undaunted by the shear enormity of his
task, Linder demonstrates an encyclopedic knowledge of the historical
context of the FLSA. His writing is perspicuous and unpretentious. While
the book could be improved at points (it is in some places less systematic
and explicit than one would like), it should at once prove educational for
practicing labor and employment attorneys, as well as theoretically
interesting to law professors and academics in the fields of labor studies
and industrial relations.
According to Linder, the FLSA "is profoundly flawed by an enormous
number of exclusions and exemptions." 2 This diagnosis guides the
structure of the book.
The first chapter describes the historical
development of the overtime provisions of the FLSA (the familiar central
requirement being that hours worked in excess of a 40-hour week must be
compensated at time and a half).3 The second chapter focuses on the
exclusion from these provisions of so-called "executive employees." The
third chapter analyzes the provisions of the FLSA that render
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1. See MARc LINDER, "MOMENTS ARE THE ELEMENTS OF PROFIT": OVERTIME AND THE
DEREGULATION OF WORKING HouRs UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2000).
2. Id. at xvii.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994). As Linder points out, this provision does not limit the
number of hours an employee is permitted to work in a given week. It merely requires the
employer to pay a premium for work in excess of forty hours.
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noncompensable a significant amount of time that employees spend (in
excess of the 40-hour week) in activities incidental to the work for which
they are paid that inure to the benefit of their employers. The fourth
chapter offers a compelling critique of the rationale underlying the FLSA's
small-business exemption.
Some readers may already be acquainted with Linder's work in this
area. Earlier versions of the second, third, and fourth chapters have
appeared in various journals in the past ten years.4 But the historically
oriented first chapter, which occupies close to half the5 book, is entirely new
and by itself justifies a reader's attention to the book
The heart of Linder's critique is the "inversion of industrial policy"
that he claims has occurred since the FLSA was enacted in 1938.6
According to Linder, the original purpose of the FLSA was to save firms
from the "withering competition of unfair labor standards." 7 In the absence
of the FLSA, firms would be free to cut wages or extend the workweek in
an effort to lower costs and thereby gain an advantage over competing
firms. Congress enacted the FLSA because it felt that the Great Depression
was caused (or at least aggravated) by just this sort of competition! The
FLSA was thus enacted at least in part to halt this downward spiral of wage
rates and other conditions of employment.
Ironically, since its inception, the FLSA has been criticized for
hindering the ability of firms to compete. This hostility led in 1989 to the
expansion of the so-called "small business exemption" to the FLSA,
reflecting a Congressional judgment that new small firms needed to be free
of the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA in order to
compete and survive. 9 Perversely, Linder maintains, this exemption
4. See, e.g., Closing the Gap Between the Reich and Poor: Which Side Is the
Departmentof Labor On?, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1993); Class Struggle at
the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-PortalAct of 1947, 39 BuFF. L. REv. 53 (1991); The
Small Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: The "Original"
Accumulation of Capitaland the Inversion of IndustrialPolicy, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 403 (1998).
5. In addition, the earlier articles have been significantly revised and updated, so that
readers familiar with them would benefit from a review of their new incarnations in Linder's
book.
6. Although this aspect of Linder's critique is left to the final chapter, it is really at the
heart of his argument because it seems to be implicit in much of the analysis of the rest of
the book as well.
7. LINDER, supra note 1, at 511.
8. Id. at 506 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-521, at 15 (1977) (testimony of Maurice
Tobin)).
9. The Act exempts from its provisions any firm doing less than $500,000 of business
in a year. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii) (1994). Linder questions whether this "volume of
business test" is truly a small business exemption, since it bears no necessary relationship to
the size of a firm. LINDER, supra note 1, at 471-76. "Without any doubt," says Linder,
"Congress knows how to write small-business exemption into a labor-protective statute
:when it so desires." Id. at 471. Oddly, in his view, Congress chose not to do so with the
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subjects small firms to the very "withering competition" the FLSA was
intended to avert. 0
In Linder's view, the FLSA's small business exemption suffers from
two principle defects. First, it rests on what he terms a "flawed theory of
capital accumulation."'" The assumption, apparently, is that "the smallest
firms grow into large ones and provide the bulk of new employment in the
United States."1 2 But this, says Linder, is merely "unproven, ideologically
driven speculation." 3
Second, Linder asserts that the small business exemption presupposes
a "dual economy" picture according to which firms small enough to qualify
for the exemption do not compete with the larger firms that are covered by
the Act.1 4 But Linder provides evidence that this assumption is false,
showing that exempt firms "exert a wage-depressing competitive impact on
covered employers ....
Strangely, Linder chooses not to develop an additional powerful
argument at his disposal. As Linder recognizes, the basic policy judgment
underlying all exemptions and limitations to fair labor standards is that the
"public interest" is in maximizing productivity and profits, and not in
preserving the labor force from overwork.16 But the fallacy here is that the
"public" whose interest supposedly lies in maximizing productivity is a
nation of workers. There is thus a fundamental incoherence in a regulatory
scheme that purports to benefit the public at the expense of employees.
Unfortunately, this assessment is left largely implicit in Linder's analysis.
After studying Linder's extensive catalogue of the defects of the
FLSA's overtime provisions, the reader might well wonder if there is a
solution. Here one might be disappointed with the book. Including a final
chapter, detailing explicitly Linder's suggestions for improving the current
regime of federal overtime regulation, might well have been helpful. 7 For
there would seem to be two basic responses to the problems Linder raises.
On the one hand, one might conclude that Congress ought to enact stricter
overtime regulations (e.g., limiting the small business exemption, providing
FLSA, opting instead for the $500,000 threshold.
10. LINDER, supra note 1, at 511.
11. Id. at 407.
12. Id. at 478.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 506-11.
15. Id. at 507.
16. Id. at xii (citing The EightHour Day, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1912, at 10).
17. There are other places in which the book might benefit from more explicitness. For
example in Chapter 3 Linder discusses the Portal-to-Portal Act, which amended the FLSA to
render uncompensable certain activities incidental to employment (such as traveling from
the plant gate to one's workstation, which in large factories can sometimes take several
minutes). But Linder does not describe these amendments in a systematic way, and the
reader is forced to piece them together from various places in the chapter.
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a cap on the number of overtime hours an employee can work in a given
week, and so on). On the other hand, one might think instead that the best
course would be to strengthen and encourage collective bargaining, so that
employees (through their bargaining representative) can decide for
themselves what overtime regime should govern their own workplace.
Linder seems to, lean toward this second option, since he speaks
approvingly of a regulatory model based on "democratic codetermination
of the length of the workday" in his preface. 8 Whether this is indeed his
position is left unclear.
This however is a minor criticism. After all, Linder might reply that it
was never his intention to offer an alternative regulatory scheme. Indeed,
he may feel that any such scheme would be a mere fantasy. As he says, "it
is chastening to realize that nothing remotely approaching a congressional
majority exists for shortening the workweek or increasing the overtime
penalty, let alone for protection against forced overwork even hedged with
exceptions for employer emergencies."' 9
Furthermore, in his view
organized labor seems unable to deal effectively with the situation. "The
pendulum has swung so far to capital's side that the labor movement
considers itself fortunate if it can stave off attempts to repeal the FLSA's
existing overtime pay provisions., 20 Thus, Linder may well believe (and
perhaps rightly) that the only worthwhile endeavor at this point is to detail
the problems with the FLSA's overtime provisions, and leave to a more
favorable time the task of charting solutions. Certainly, in this project
Linder has succeeded admirably.

18. LINDER, supra note 1, at xii.
19. Id. at 205.
20. Id. at 206.

